siontomakethepassageofTARPmorelikely.ThuswewillneverknowifthemarketdownturnthatfollowedtheLehmanbankruptcyreflectedfearofcontagionfromLehmantotherealeconomyorfearofthedepthsofexistingproblemsintherealeconomythatwerehighlightedsodramaticallybyregulators.Inthispaperweanalyzethemechanismsbywhichsuchriskcouldcauseaneconomy-widecol-lapse.Wefocusontwotypesofcontagionthatmightleadtosystemicriskproblems:(1)informationcontagion,monriskfactors;or(2)counterpartycontagion,whereoneimportantfinancialinstitution’scollapseleadsdirectlytotroublesatothercred-itorfirmswhosetroublessnowballanddriveotherfirmsintodistress.TheefficacyofTBTFpoliciesdependscruciallyonwhichofthesetwotypesofsystemicriskmechanismsdominates.Counterpartycontagionmaywarrantinterventioninindividualbankfailureswhileinformationcontagiondoesnot.