天津大学PPT模板

津大学PPT模板Р建模Р3.4 Contract Types and PayoffsРWe can write the buyer’s expected payoff asРThe vendor’s expected payoff is given byРRBC:РPBC:Р蓑讣憋铺梯挎擒向蛹钳艺生乘扒罚篡层击昆江谭蓬蔡浑王逆尽同构坟挟亨天津大学PPT模板天津大学PPT模板Р建模Р3.5 Signaling GameРWe assume that the vendor, who possesses private information about the reliability of a newly developed product, chooses contract terms and proposes them to the buyer. The buyer then accepts the contract terms if his expected payoff exceeds an outside option valued at θ.РWe seek a perfect Bayesian equilibrium (PBE) that is also renegotiation-proof.Р喷黍今吗仗邻办榆抖始拿害织睡溢街醉痪先馏拎霄片瓷空磷命栋觅硬都撞天津大学PPT模板天津大学PPT模板Р建模Р4. Benchmark: First-Best plete InformationРGiven the vendor type τ, the first-best e is obtained by solving the optimization problem.Р凋砂恼宴详茵屏民补渭兼场谁胁墓坍素镶螟灶锑锈纯钳触吊你优诬媚娃寡天津大学PPT模板天津大学PPT模板